Final Chapter before Conclusion reproduced here. The Organisation of the Logic: Being, Essence, Concept Hegelian Logic is the absolute genesis of sense, a sense which, to itself, is its own sense, which is not opposed to the being whose sense it is, but which is sense and being simultaneously. This genesis resembles an organic growth, a perpetual reproduction and self-amplification. There is no external purposiveness, but an immanent purposiveness whose image in nature is organic life. The contradiction of this growth is its immanent intentionality; how can it grow?

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Final Chapter before Conclusion reproduced here. The Organisation of the Logic: Being, Essence, Concept Hegelian Logic is the absolute genesis of sense, a sense which, to itself, is its own sense, which is not opposed to the being whose sense it is, but which is sense and being simultaneously. This genesis resembles an organic growth, a perpetual reproduction and self-amplification.

There is no external purposiveness, but an immanent purposiveness whose image in nature is organic life. The contradiction of this growth is its immanent intentionality; how can it grow? Does not its beginning already contain implicitly all of what its end will be?

An artist constantly reproduces the same faces. Across his paintings, we can follow something like an intention which becomes explicit and precise, and which nevertheless was unaware of itself in the first works. He does not, however, repeat himself. This reproduction is creation; it is simultaneously intuitive and discursive. The totality is always immanent, the beginning indicates the end, only the end allows us to comprehend retrospectively the beginning.

There is no other way to conceive Hegelian Logic. It is always the whole that develops itself, that reproduces itself in a more profound and more explicit form. The circle of Essence takes up that of Being, and the circle of the Concept that of Essence. Or rather, in the medium of the Logos, no one word would be able to imply this disappearance of the Whole. The Whole is there insofar as it is excluded, sublated; it is there because it is lacking; it is there as negation in the position and as internal negativity.

The Whole that we would like to put outside is in fact inside, like the exterior which is only an interior; these words of representation, inside and outside, fit a nature that realises the absolute Idea in spatial indifference, but they are nothing but dialectical terms in the absolute form or in the element of the Logos. We happened to cite Bergson while speaking of Hegel.

It is certainly difficult to imagine philosophical temperaments as different as theirs. The same creative idea is, however, present in the Hegelian Logic and in the Bergsonian dynamic schema.

The idea, however, in Hegel, is truly an idea, sense, while, in Bergson, it is this side of or beyond sense. In the Hegelian Logos, genesis is comprehensive genesis; being comprehends itself and comprehends itself as far as the ontic limits of all comprehension. One has to see in Hegelian Logic this absolute medium of all comprehension, of all meaning, which is creation at the same time as it is comprehension, because it does not refer to anything other than itself it contains this other , because it is not therefore the comprehension of something, but self-comprehension, and, by being self-comprehension, comprehension of everything, being and sense.

What the Hegelian Logos alone excludes is a monadism which would limit reflection; a monadism is the existence of unsurpassable, individual structures.

The Whole is indeed Singularity, but the authentic Singularity is only the Whole in the opening of its own development-the concrete universal-the understanding which is at the same time intuitive and discursive. Dialectical evolution owes its movement not to the point from which it starts, but to the end towards which it tends-and it is external at the same time as being parallel to being-it is a dualism. Dialectical evolution is attraction and instinct; it starts from immediate being and returns to immediate being.

It is truth only as engendered truth. On the other hand, it is indeed also dualistic, but this dualism is not, as in Spinoza, the parallelism of Logos and Nature which never encounter one another.

It is the dualism of mediation. Nature and Logos are simultaneously opposite and identical. This is why the Logos can think itself and the other, contradict itself in itself, and why Nature, which is the anti-Logos, can appear as Logos. The Logos is the absolute truth as self-genesis. However, how can we speak of a truth of the form? The logic, as the science of the absolute form, is the truth for itself, and by means of being opposed to the other philosophical sciences, those of nature and spirit, it is pure truth: "For this reason, this form is of quite another nature than logical form is ordinarily taken to be.

It is already on its own account truth, since this content is adequate to its form, or the reality to its concept; and it is the pure truth because the determinations of the content do not yet have the form of an absolute otherness or of absolute immediacy" Science of Logic Truth is, as Kant said, the agreement of knowledge with its object, and this definition has the greatest, or rather the highest value. But in this case, what are we to think of Kantianism, according to which the knowledge of reason is incapable of grasping things in themselves, and actuality is alien to the concept?

If we remember this definition in connection with the fundamental assertion of transcendental idealism, that reason as knowing is incapable of apprehending things-in-themselves, that reality lies absolutely outside the concept, then it is at once evident that a reason such as this which is unable to put itself in agreement with its object, the things-in-themselves, and things-in-themselves that are not in agreement with the concept of reason, the concept that is not in agreement with reality, and a reality that does not agree with the concept, are untrue conceptions.

If Kant had considered the idea of an intuitive understanding in the light of the above definition of truth, he would have treated that idea which expresses the required agreement, not as a figment of thought but rather as the truth. Science of Logic In effect, the absolute form is not contentless. Its content is itself. It has its being within itself because it is the universal.

It is intuitive thought. Kant, however, stated this principle of a priori synthesis in which duality could be known in unity. Therefore he would have been able to see that his critique, in regard to formalism, was genuinely lacking in scope-the critique of a criterion which would be valuable for all knowledge.

To separate in this way the content as an alien being and seek the truth of such a content, while forgetting that truth is agreement, is to turn this content into an inconceivable content, into a soulless content, a senseless content. Now, if, on the basis of this separation, we consider the logic itself as contentless, thought as purely abstract and empty, in the usual sense of formalism, then it is just as vain to speak of agreement since in order for there to be agreement there must be two , and therefore to speak of truth.

The question of truth was really posed in a much more penetrating way by Kant with his notion of an a priori synthetic thought, that is, with his notion of a thought capable of being its content for itself: "Logic being the science of the absolute form, this formal science, in order to be true, must possess in its own self a content adequate to its form; and all the more, since the formal element of logic is the pure form, and therefore the truth of logic must be the pure truth itself" Science of Logic What characterises the logical element is precisely this adequation between actuality and concept which is the complete development of the form.

Logic is not concrete truth, that of the Idea in nature or in spirit, but the pure truth, the development of the concept in its actuality and of actuality in its concept, the life of the concept.

When we consider the forms of logic, we note that, in their isolation, they are without truth, because, insofar as they are some forms, they have a content inadequate to the whole thinking movement, to conception itself.

For example, the affirmative Judgment is considered in its form as true, since it is referred exclusively to the content. But this Judgment is dialectical in its form. It states that the singular is universal, that being is concept. It contradicts itself in itself. It lacks what the definition of truth requires, the agreement of the concept and the object. The absolute concept the unique form , therefore, must rediscover itself in all of its moments, in the forms which, insofar as they are manifold, present themselves as content.

The science of logic therefore is the pure truth. These sciences are not the empirical sciences considered in the Phenomenology: These concrete sciences do, of course, present themselves in a more real form of the idea than logic does; but this is not by turning back again to the reality abandoned by the consciousness which has risen above its mode as phenomenon to the level of science, nor by reverting to the use of forms such as the categories and concepts of reflection, whose finitude and untruth have been demonstrated in the logic.

On the contrary, logic exhibits the elevation of the idea to that level from which its becomes the creator of nature and passes over to the form of a concrete immediacy whose concept, however, breaks up this shape again in order to realise itself as concrete spirit. Science of Logic a spirit which, in the highest degree, is precisely the Logos, philosophy.

The logical element shows itself therefore indeed as the supreme mediation. It is there immediately as nature and as finite spirit, but as spirit it completes itself, it returns to itself. The Logic is the genesis of the absolute Idea.

This absolute Idea, which in the element of universality contains the whole life of thought, for Hegel, "alone is being, imperishable life, self-knowing truth, and is all truth" Science of Logic It is the sole object and the sole form of philosophy: "Since it contains all deterrninateness within it, and its essential nature is to return to itself through its self-determination or particularisation, it has various shapes, and the business of philosophy is to recognise it in these" Science of Logic Thus nature and spirit are distinct modes through which the Absolute Idea presents its Dasein-spatial indifference and temporal dispersion-just as art and religion are distinct modes through which it apprehends itself and endows the image of the self with that of a being.

Philosophy, however, is the highest-the only authentic-mode of grasping the absolute Idea, because its modality is the highest, the concept, the only one in which truth exists as truth. Philosophy comprehends, therefore, the figures of real finitude, nature, and the figures of ideal finitude, spirit. Philosophy conceives them as it conceives religion and art, but it conceives itself.

This self-conception is "above everything else the Logic. To comprehend nature and spirit in this way, for philosophy, is to see the creative source itself in the Logos; it is to see across the Logos. Language is the house of being as sense. The Logos is the primordial, originary voice which is indeed an exteriorisation, but an exteriorisation which, as such, disappears as soon as it appears.

Hegel says that the only determination is then for this sense to hear itself, to comprehend itself. It is the pure thought in which difference the one that will be set free in external nature and in finite spirit is the alterity that leads thought to sublate itself. Marx, for example, has accused him of always rediscovering the logical element in the philosophy of nature and history, instead of seeing in this element a reflection of concrete being, a fleshless shadow.

In fact, these two charges destroy one another. They can be justified in this or that particular case. The Logic is opposed to experience as ontology is opposed to anthropology. Hegel does not want to do without experience but to reduce in the modern sense of the term anthropology and to show, at the very heart of the ontologic, that "philosophy must alienate itself. The ordinary sense of the word method, however, is no longer at work here and one has to dispel a false interpretation.

The method, which is the universal of the Logic, does not separate the objective from the subjective. As absolute method, it is the opposite of instrumental knowledge or of external reflection, which would be merely subjective. This is not sensible immediacy, but the immediacy of pure thought "that we can, if you like, just as well call super-sensible or inner intuition. When we require a demonstration of being, we mean thereby that we want to determine being, to make it emerge from the abstraction of pure thought, from the mere self-relation.

To demonstrate being is therefore to realise the concept, to determine it. In the Science of Logic, from the start we rediscover this very experience of knowledge which is the realisation or the determination of the concept. Being, considered as irreducible to pure thought, is the absolute self-relation which is also pure thought. Thought does not lack being; it lacks determination.

And being, this mere self-relation, also lacks determination. In the form of being and nothingness, of being and the question of being, their opposition is reciprocal. What is required is the sublation of this pure self-relation. For the method, the beginning is the universal, which is indeterminate. But this very simplicity of the beginning is its determination. Insofar as it is the consciousness of this indeterminate universality, the method knows that it is only a moment and that the concept is still not determined in itself and for itself.

If the method, however, remains at the level of this subjective consciousness, it takes this beginning merely as the abstract from which something is lacking. It understands abstraction as the psychological process which, having at first put aside that from which it is abstracted, claims to be made complete through that from which it is abstracted.


Logic & Existence

Tojazragore It is the intelligibility of being, its in-itself for itself, but still in the element of the in-itself. SyphilisVictim rated it really liked it Dec 27, But the logic of essence is not only the logic of the science of the phenomenal world. Jean Hyppolite, Logic and Existence — PhilPapers It is the movement by which being negates itself, turns itself into appearance, and the movement by which, while negating itself, it posits itself, makes itself essence in appearance. These, however, are the determinations that are truly prey to nean dialectic, and there is no stable object below them. The first term is always the universal as immediate, but then it is determined, and this determination is the negation which it has in itself.


Logic and Existence








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